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Junlong Chen, Xiaomeng Wang and Zhaopeng Chu
School of Economics, Northeastern University at Qinhuangdao, Qinhuangdao, China
ABSTRACT
This article constructs a duopoly market with product differenti-
ation and analyses profits, consumer surplus and social welfare
under three conditions: (a) two enterprises have sufficient cap-
acity; (b) one enterprise has insufficient capacity, and another
enterprise has excess capacity that is not shared; and (c) one
enterprise has insufficient capacity, and another enterprise has
excess capacity and engages in capacity sharing. Through com-
parison, the implementation conditions for and effects of capacity
sharing and the role of product differentiation are revealed. The
results show that capacity sharing helps increase producer surplus
and social welfare. Capacity constraints reduce social welfare but
can be solved by capacity sharing. Capacity sharing can only be
realised when both enterprises are profitable, and the charge for
capacity sharing should not be too high or too low. Product dif-
ferentiation has impacts on output, profit, consumer surplus and
social welfare, and these impacts are restricted by the existence
of capacity constraints and capacity sharing.
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1. Introduction
Unbalanced capacity (overcapacity or insufficient capacity) is very popular in the
market economy and can lead to the inefficient allocation of capacity resources.
Traditional governance ideas are limited to individual corporate governance behav-
iour. Capacity sharing can provide an effective way for enterprises to optimize cap-
acity decisions, resolve overcapacity and avoid recurring overcapacity. If capacity can
be shared, enterprises with overcapacity can share with enterprises with insufficient
capacity so the latter can achieve more output. Therefore, a feasible idea for solving
unbalanced capacity is sharing capacity resources in time and space.1
Capacity sharing is characterised by the separation of ownership and use rights.
Capacity sharing is an economic behaviour between the supply side and the demand
side to realise the common use of capacity through some channels and technical
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means, aiming to save resources and improve the utilisation rate of capacity. Capacity
sharing is a nonzero-sum game with win-win results. On the one hand, the sharing
economy has evolved and spread to various sectors of the economy (Geissinger et al.,
2019; Schivinski et al., 2016; Lee et al., 2016; Sutherland & Jarrahi, 2018). On the
other hand, there are widespread capacity trading phenomena in retail, automobile
manufacturing, shipping and power markets (Ç€omez et al., 2012; Hu et al., 2013;
Wang et al., 2018; Yan et al., 2019).
A large number of scholars use game theory to explore the reasons for, effects of
and means of capacity sharing. In terms of the effects, some scholars believe that the
effects are positive, helping alleviate shortages of capacity, realize multiparty win-win
situations and improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the whole economy.
Renna and Argoneto (2011) propose a capacity sharing coordination mechanism in a
production network composed of independent factories based on cooperative game
theory and verify the effectiveness of this mechanism in improving plant benefits
through simulation. Li and Zhang (2015) study capacity sharing behaviour between
two freight forwarders and argue that capacity reservation between agents could
achieve a win-win situation for both carriers and agents. Van Goeverden and Correia
(2018) argue that the shortage of bicycle capacity in railway stations can be alleviated
through point-to-point bike sharing. Some scholars also note that the realisation of
positive effects of capacity sharing needs to be based on certain conditions; otherwise,
capacity sharing may be unbeneficial or even negative. Yu et al. (2015) note the
potential benefits of capacity sharing and the circumstances under which benefits can
be realised. However, in an environment where enterprises have heterogeneous work
content and service variability, capacity sharing may not be beneficial. Tinoco et al.
(2017) show that the stability and long-term viability of a partnership strongly
depends on the cost sharing agreement, in combination with the allocation mechan-
ism used to share the costs (or gains) of the coordination. Tian and Jiang (2018) find
that the sharing economy affects the earnings of manufacturers and retailers in the
distribution channels, and the impact depends on the cost efficiency of man-
ufacturers’ capacity. When capacity costs are relatively high, both manufacturers and
retailers benefit from sharing. When capacity costs are low, sharing makes manufac-
turers and retailers worse off. In terms of strategies, many scholars use game theory
to explore the optimal capacity sharing strategies of enterprises. Yoon and Nof (2011)
study the joint or separate decisions on demand and the capacity sharing protocol in
an enterprise collaborative network. Aloui and Jebsi (2016) analyse the optimal cap-
acity sharing management strategy of a bilateral monopoly intermediary platform
with positive cross-externalities and bilateral congestion and argue that the capacity
sharing management of any bilateral business platform should not only consider the
expected participation level of both parties but also consider the size of the network
benefits. Yang et al. (2017) study the cost allocation of capacity investment between
manufacturers and retailers in two cases of partial and total cost sharing. Wang et al.
(2018) study the optimal strategy of airline capacity allocation by using a dynamic
programming model.
However, there are some issues that need to be addressed in the study of capacity
sharing. The first is the effects of capacity sharing. Capacity sharing affects a series of
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market competition factors, such as market price, competition intensity, profit, and
utility functions, which affect the equilibrium results and performance of the
entire market. Nevertheless, existing research mainly reveals the effects of capacity
sharing on the profits of the enterprise and emphasises the win-win results
between enterprises. In addition, the current literature pays little attention to the
effects on consumers, governments and other stakeholders and fails to fully con-
sider the multiple effects of capacity sharing. This article compensates for these
deficiencies by investigating the impacts of capacity sharing on consumer surplus
and social welfare.
Second, there are not sufficient studies that combine capacity constraints with cap-
acity sharing. Capacity constraints can lead to insufficient capacity, and many indus-
tries face such constraints due to funding, technology, policies, etc. (Gelhausen,
Berster, & Wilken, 2013; Heo et al., 2013; Nie, 2018; Wang & Dargahi, 2013).
Capacity constraints, as a common phenomenon, have multiple effects on output,
competition strategies, regulation mechanism design, innovation, etc.; these effects
have been widely studied (Chen et al., 2018; Mayo & Sappington, 2016; Nie, 2014;
Nie & Wang, 2019). There is an important issue in the existing research on whether
capacity constraints are unfavourable to enterprises (Chen, He, & Paudel, 2018; Chen,
Nie, & Wang, 2015; Eso, Nocke, & White, 2010; Genc & Reynolds, 2011; Nie &
Chen, 2012). Following this research, this article examines the effects of capacity con-
straints on the equilibrium results and judges whether capacity sharing can solve the
problem of insufficient capacity.
Third, competition has an impact on capacity investment decisions (Goyal &
Netessine, 2007), but there are few studies on capacity sharing among competitive
enterprises. Most studies assume that capacity sharing is a cooperative relationship
between two parties and that the game of capacity sharing between competing enter-
prises is less relevant. Wu et al. (2013) and Wu et al. (2014) study two prevailing
types of contracts that address horizontal-capacity-coordination issues between two
possible sources: an integrated device manufacturer and a foundry. Qi et al. (2015)
argue that whether a firm invests in sharing capacity is affected by whether the cap-
acity is used by its competitor. Guo and Wu (2018) study the optimal strategies and
firm profitability related to capacity sharing between competing firms but do not con-
sider product differentiation. This article analyses capacity sharing between two com-
petitive enterprises with different products.
Fourth, product differentiation is an important factor affecting capacity choice.
Chen et al. (2019) construct a duopoly model to investigate the influence of hetero-
geneity on capacity decisions under Cournot and Bertrand competition. However,
research on capacity sharing focuses less on product differentiation (Chen, Xie, &
Liu, 2020), and the product homogeneity assumption does not fit reality. There are
two perspectives on the role of product differentiation. One perspective argues that
differentiation can enhance the market competitiveness of products and increase cor-
porate profits (Caves, 1971; Ju et al., 2013). Another view is that product differenti-
ation improves financial performance but does not improve market performance
(Chen et al., 2015). In this regard, this article incorporates product differentiation
into the capacity sharing analysis framework and examines the impacts of product
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differentiation on enterprise output, profit, consumer surplus, social welfare and cap-
acity sharing.
This article constructs a duopoly model to investigate three cases, including no
capacity constraints, capacity constraints without sharing, and capacity constraints
with sharing, and to examine the multiple effects of capacity sharing on profits, con-
sumer surplus, and social welfare. The article also examines whether capacity sharing
is feasible. In addition, product differentiation is a prerequisite, and its effects
are examined.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. The second part builds a
duopoly model of capacity sharing. The third part is the model analysis. The last part
presents the conclusions of the article.
2. The model
To construct a duopoly model of two enterprises under Cournot competition, the
assumptions are as follows.
Assumption 1. Assume that there are two enterprises that engage in Cournot com-
petition around production, namely, Enterprise 1 and Enterprise 2. The demand
function is given by pi ¼ a qi  rqj (i, j ¼1,2 and i 6¼ j), where a is a positive
constant and qi is the output of firm i: Product homogeneity is defined
as r 2 ð0, 1, 1 r is product differentiation, and a larger r means a lower level
of product differentiation.
Assumption 2. The production technologies of the two enterprises are the same,
so the marginal cost is assumed to be a constant c, and a > c > 0; thus, the
profit function of Enterprise i is pi ¼ ðpi  cÞqi, and enterprises pursue profit
maximisation. The capacity of enterprise i is denoted as ki, which is a constant,
and i ¼ 1 or 2. Assume that the total social welfare (SW) is the sum of producer
surplus (PS) and consumer surplus (PS), i.e. SW ¼ p1 þ p2 þ CS,
where CS ¼ q21þq22þ2rq1q22 :2
Assumption 3. The outputs of enterprises depend on the profit maximisation object-
ive and whether it has sufficient capacity. It is assumed that the capacity of enter-
prises is exogenous. If capacity is sufficient, the output of the enterprises can be
produced according to the principle of profit maximisation. Otherwise, production
can only be carried out under capacity constraints, and production with maximum
profit cannot be achieved.3 Although the products of the two enterprises may be dif-
ferent, it is assumed that their capacity can be used by the other party. For example,
some overcapacity garment manufacturers often help other brands to produce while
producing their own products in China.
Under the above assumptions, three cases are investigated and compared: (a) both
enterprises have sufficient capacity; (b) one enterprise has insufficient capacity, while
one enterprise has overcapacity but does not share; and (c) one enterprise has insuffi-
cient capacity, while one enterprise has overcapacity and does share. The impacts of
product differentiation and capacity sharing on profit, consumer surplus and social
welfare are revealed.
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3. Model analysis
This section first analyses the equilibrium outcomes in each scenario and then com-
pares the equilibrium results in three cases.
3.1. Sufficient capacity
In this scenario, two enterprises have sufficient capacity. According to the profit
maximisation objective, the first-order condition @pi@qi ¼ 0 needs to be satisfied. The
quantity reaction functions and equilibrium outputs can be expressed as
q1 ¼ acrq22 (1)
q2 ¼ acrq12 (2)
q1 ¼ q2 ¼
ac
2þ r (3)
The reaction functions and the corresponding equilibrium (E) are shown in
Figure 1.4
Lemma 1. The equilibrium profits, consumer surplus and social welfare of the two
firms are
p1 ¼ p2 ¼ ðacÞ
2
ð2þrÞ2 , CS
 ¼ ðacÞ2ðrþ1Þð2þrÞ2 , and SW ¼
ðacÞ2ðrþ3Þ
ð2þrÞ2 :
From the analysis of the effects of r on production, profit, consumer surplus, and
social welfare by equation (3) and Lemma 1, Proposition 1 can be proposed.
Figure 1. The reaction functions and the corresponding equilibrium when enterprises have suffi-
cient capacity.
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@r < 0, and
@SW
@r < 0:
Proof. See Appendix A.
The economic implication of Proposition 1 is that in the absence of capacity con-
straints, increasing product differentiation increases profits and consumer surplus by
increasing production, thereby increasing social welfare. In extreme cases, the prod-
ucts of the two enterprises are completely heterogeneous. Even if the monopoly
causes prices to rise, consumer surplus also increases as consumers enjoy different
commodities.
3.2. Insufficient capacity without sharing
Now change the original hypothesis and assume that Enterprise 1 has insufficient
capacity and faces maximum capacity, which is defined as k1 < ac2þr :
5 Enterprise 2 has
sufficient capacity. If there is no capacity sharing, then the ceiling on production by
the enterprise is k1: According to the principle of profit maximisation, the reaction
functions and equilibrium outputs are expressed as
q1 ¼









Figure 2. The reaction functions and the corresponding equilibrium when one enterprise has insuf-
ficient capacity and no capacity sharing.
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q2 ¼ acrq12 (5)




Compare with the previous case. Correcting the reflection function and the equi-
librium point of Figure 1, the output of Enterprise 1 encountered a ceiling of k1:
The reaction functions and the corresponding equilibrium point (E) are shown in
Figure 2. It can be found that RF1 becomes a piecewise function and the equilibrium
point changes from E to E, so the output of Enterprise 1 decreases and the output
of Enterprise 2 increases.








 ¼ ð43r2Þk21þ2ðacÞrk1þðacÞ28 , and
SW ¼ ð3r24Þk212ðacÞð3r4Þk1þ3ðacÞ28 :
From the above Lemma, it can be found that the equilibrium results are affected
by capacity constraints (k1) and product differentiation (r). From the investigation of
the effects of k1 and r on the equilibrium outputs, profits, consumer surplus and
social welfare, respectively, Proposition 2 can be obtained.
Proposition 2. When an enterprise has capacity constraints without sharing, the


















> 0, and @SW

@k1













@r > 0, and
@SW
@r < 0:
Proof. See Appendix B.
Compared with the first case, the relationship between consumer surplus and prod-
uct differentiation has changed, which indicates that the impacts of product differenti-
ation on consumption surplus are affected by capacity constraints. According to the
function of CS, the higher the product differentiation, even when the total outputs are
higher, the greater is the decline of 2rq1q2, and the lower is the total consumer surplus.
3.3. Insufficient capacity with sharing
In introducing capacity sharing, it is assumed that Enterprise 2 has sufficient capacity to
meet the needs of Enterprise 1 and is willing to share, but for each unit of capacity,
Enterprise 1 is charged at b > 0: Therefore, Enterprise 1 does not worry about capacity but
considers the cost of payment. The profit functions of the two enterprises are given by6
p1 ¼ ðrq2 þ a c q1Þq1  ðq1  k1Þb (7)
p2 ¼ ðrq1 þ a c q2Þq2 þ ðq1  k1Þb (8)
Solving the reaction functions and the equilibrium outputs of the two enterprises
(E), the following results can be obtained.
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q1 ¼ acbrq22 (9)
q2 ¼ acrq12 (10)
q1 ¼
rðacÞ2ðabcÞ
r2  4 (11)
q2 ¼
2ðacÞ þ rðabcÞ
r2  4 (12)
The reaction functions and the corresponding equilibrium point (E) are shown
in Figure 3. It can be found that RF1 moves to the left compared with the first case
and that the equilibrium point changes from E to E, where the output of
Enterprise 1 is lower than the first case but higher than the second case and the out-
put of Enterprise 2 is larger than the first case but lower than the second case.
Lemma 3. The profits of the two enterprises, consumer surplus, and social welfare in
this case are
p1 ¼
bk1r4 þ ða22ac8bk1 þ c2Þr24ðacÞðabcÞr þ 4ða2 þ b2 þ c2Þ8aðbþ cÞ þ 8bðcþ 2k1Þ
ðr2  4Þ2
p2 ¼
bk1r4 þ br3ðacÞ þ r2ð3b24bðac2k1Þ þ ðacÞ2Þ
4rðacÞ28b2 þ 8bðac2k1Þ þ 4ðacÞ2
ðr2  4Þ2
Figure 3. The reaction functions and the corresponding equilibrium when there is cap-
acity sharing.
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CS ¼ 2ðacÞðabcÞr
3 þ ð6ðacÞ2 þ 6ðacÞb3b2Þr2 þ 8ðacÞ28ðacÞbþ 4b2
2ðr2  4Þ2
SW ¼





þ24a28ðbþ 6cÞa4b2 þ 8bcþ 24c2
2ðr2  4Þ2
If capacity sharing is to be achieved, it is necessary to satisfy Enterprise 1’s willing-
ness to purchase the capacity of Enterprise 2 (p1  p1 ) and Enterprise 2’s willing-
ness to sell its own capacity (p2  p2 ).
Lemma 4. When k1r
4þðacÞr3þ2ðacþ2k1Þr28ðacÞr
6r216  b  k1r
2ðacÞrþ2a2c4k1
2 , both par-
ties will achieve capacity sharing, and k1, r is negatively related to the upper and
lower limits of b and positively related to a c:
Proof. See Appendix C.
According to Lemma 3 and Proposition 3, product differentiation, the cost of cap-
acity and capacity constraints affect the equilibrium results.
Proposition 3. When there are capacity constraints but capacity sharing, the effects














@r < 0; the effects of k1 on the equilibrium results are
@q1
@k1






















@b < 0, and
@SW
@b < 0; and the
optimal capacity sharing charge b ¼ k1r4þðacÞr3þ2ðacþ2k1Þr28ðacÞr6r216 :
Proof. See Appendix D.
Compared with the first two cases, there are some differences in the impacts of
product differentiation in the third case. Increasing product differentiation is not con-
ducive to increasing the output of Enterprise 2 but will increase the output of
Enterprise 1, profits and consumer surplus, generally improving social welfare.
Additionally, capacity constraints have no effect because of capacity sharing, and
reducing capacity sharing costs helps increase social welfare.
3.4. Comparisons
Here, the difference between the second case and the first case in the equilibrium
results are compared, and the impacts of capacity constraints are analysed.
Proposition 4. If the equilibrium results of the cases of insufficient capacity without














 < CS and SW < SW:
Proof. See Appendix E.
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Proposition 4 means that insufficient capacity limits the enterprise’s output and
profit while benefiting its competitor. In addition, consumer surplus and social wel-
fare may truly decline. Therefore, insufficient capacity is inefficient for social welfare.
When the equilibrium outputs, profits, CS and SW in the third case are compared
with those in the second case, Proposition 5 can be obtained.
Proposition 5. If the equilibrium results of the cases of capacity sharing and insuffi-














 > CS, and SW > SW:
Proof. See Appendix F.
The meaning of Proposition 5 is that if capacity sharing can be implemented, then
it helps to increase consumer surplus and social welfare, so capacity sharing should
be actively encouraged. Although Enterprise 2 increases the production of competi-
tors because of sharing, it compensates by charging (b). To achieve capacity sharing,
the capacity charge must be within a reasonable range: if it is too high (Enterprise 1
will choose not to share) or too low (Enterprise 2 will choose not to share), no cap-
acity sharing will occur.
Comparing the third case with the first case in the equilibrium results, the results
are as follows.
Proposition 6. The comparison results of the cases of sufficient capacity and capacity
















and SW < SW:
Proof. See Appendix G.
The meaning of Proposition 6 is that if there is insufficient capacity, capacity shar-
ing can improve the profit of Enterprise 2 but achieve lower consumer surplus and
social welfare. Therefore, capacity sharing is an effective way to optimize the alloca-
tion of capacity resources when capacity is insufficient but still inefficient compared
to the case of sufficient capacity.
4. Conclusion
This article sets up a capacity sharing model based on duopoly and analyses the out-
puts, profits, consumer surplus and social welfare in three market environments. In
contrast to other studies, this article analyses capacity sharing between two competi-
tive enterprises with product differentiation, reveals the multiple effects of capacity
sharing and product differentiation on the equilibrium results, and has some signifi-
cance for promoting the development of capacity sharing and the optimisation of
capacity sharing strategies. The conclusions are as follows.
First, capacity sharing has effects on the equilibrium results. When capacity shar-
ing is implemented, consumer surplus and social welfare decrease compared with
their levels in the case of sufficient capacity. Compared with their levels in case of the
existence of constraints without sharing, consumer surplus, producer surplus and
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social welfare in the case of capacity sharing increase. Therefore, capacity sharing can
enhance social welfare under certain conditions. Compared with their levels in the
case of sufficient capacity, consumer surplus and social welfare in the case of insuffi-
cient capacity without sharing decline. Thus, capacity constraints reduce consumer
surplus and social welfare.
Second, capacity sharing needs to be realised only when both enterprises are prof-
itable. Capacity sharing is beneficial to enterprises with sufficient capacity and those
with insufficient capacity if the capacity sharing cost (b) is not too high or too low,
and the optimal capacity sharing charge for social welfare is b ¼
k1r4þðacÞr3þ2ðacþ2k1Þr28ðacÞr
6r216 : Therefore, capacity sharing is an effective way to solve
capacity constraints, and the price of capacity sharing transactions is closely related
to the existence of capacity sharing and social welfare. To optimize the transaction
price, an alternative suggestion is that the government can provide price guidance,
subsidies, etc., without destroying market competition.
Third, product differentiation has impacts on firm production and profits, con-
sumer surplus, and social welfare, and the impacts are affected by the existence of
capacity constraints and the existence of capacity sharing. In the cases of sufficient
capacity and capacity sharing, increasing product differentiation can help increase
profits, consumer surplus and social welfare, while in the presence of capacity con-
straints without sharing, increasing product differentiation reduces consumer surplus
but increases profits and social welfare. Therefore, it is necessary to promote means
for enterprises to develop in a differentiated way and avoid homogenous development
to increase corporate profits and social welfare.
This article has some limitations that can be addressed in future research. First, this
article only considers two enterprises and ignores capacity sharing among multiple
enterprises. Second, this article does not consider the effects of third-party trading plat-
forms and government intervention on capacity sharing. Third, other oligopolistic mar-
ket structures (e.g. Stackelberg and Bertrand competition) are not considered. Fourth,
one implicit assumption of this research is that the enterprise can hold overcapacity at
no cost, while the impacts of overcapacity on enterprise cost are significant in reality.
Notes
1. In the study, the negative impacts of overcapacity on enterprises are not taken into
account, and this paper focuses on the roles of capacity sharing in insufficient capacity.
2. In accordance with Singh and Vives (1984), Jain and Pal (2012), and Fanti (2016), let the




from which the demand function is deduced, and the consumer
surplus CS ¼ q12þq22þ2rq1q22 :
3. Insufficient capacity caused by capacity constraints implies that actual production is lower
than the production that maximizes profit. Therefore, as long as the cost of capacity
sharing is lower than the benefit, capacity sharing is an effective way to solve the problem
of insufficient capacity (capacity constraints). In addition, it is assumed that the enterprise
with sufficient capacity does not face capacity constraints (or there exist capacity
constraints that do not affect the profit maximization).
4. The quantity reaction functions of Enterprises 1 and 2 are denoted as RF1 and RF2
respectively.
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5. In the absence of capacity constraints, the optimal production of Enterprise 1 is ac2þr : Thus
only when k1 < ac2þr is there insufficient capacity.
6. It is assumed that there is no difference in capacity and that enterprises can produce
differentiated products based on the same capacity resources.
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Proof of Proposition 1
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Proof of Proposition 2
Given k1 < ac2þr , the results can be obtained that
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Appendix C
Proof of Lemma 4
The results can be deduced that when 0 < b < k1r
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Proof of Proposition 3
Given k1r
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Proof of Proposition 4
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Proof of Proposition 5
q1  q1 ¼
rðacÞ2ðabc2k1Þ
r2  4 > 0
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Proof of Proposition 6
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